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1 Introduction
The availability of large firm-level data-bases enables tax researchers to study
firms’ behavioral response to effective profit tax rates (e.g., in terms of invest-
ment, sales and employment). A fairly recent strand of literature exploits micro-
level information on profit taxes – so-called backward-looking effective profit tax
rates,1 which are defined as the ratio between a firm’s profit tax payments and
its operating profits (see, e.g., Kemsley, 1998; Desai, Foley, and Hines, 2004;
Mutti and Grubert, 2004). One notable advantage of such data is the varia-
tion in tax rates even within countries, which facilitates identification of firms’
response to taxation. However, a major drawback of backward-looking rates
is that tax liabilities may be affected by firms’ tax planning activities (for in-
stance, higher investments in the past are associated with an increased amount
of current depreciation allowances and, hence, with lower tax payments). Thus,
backward-looking effective tax rates are inherently prone to endogeneity induc-
ing possibly biased estimation results (see Devereux and Griffith, 2002, for a
discussion).
At the aggregate country level, the dominant paradigm is that one should
use forward-looking effective tax rates for inference about the response of eco-
nomic activity to profit taxation (see, e.g., Devereux and Freeman, 1995; De-
vereux and Griffith, 1998; Devereux, 2007, provides an excellent overview).
Forward-looking effective tax rates inform about the effective tax burden of a
hypothetical investment project. The general idea behind these rates is to incor-
porate relevant determinants of the tax code (i.e., statutory tax rates and tax
base allowances) into a neoclassical investment model (see Jorgensen, 1963; Hall
and Jorgensen, 1967). Taking standard assumptions about a firm’s investment,
financing, and repatriation decisions and assuming that a firm seeks the most
favorable tax base allowances, forward-looking effective tax rates are indepen-
dent of tax planning activities and are, therefore, exogenous from an empirical
perspective. Such forward-looking effective tax rates are typically calculated
at the country level for a given set of investment and financing opportunities
(e.g., buildings, machinery, and inventory; debt, new equity and retained earn-
ings). The country-specific effective tax rate is a weighted average over these
opportunities, where the weights are pre-defined and typically identical for all
countries under consideration.2
1Tax burden measures derived from balance sheets are usually known as backward-looking,
since they are calculated ex-post from the viewpoint of a firm’s business strategies and tax
planning activities. They are referred to as effective tax rates, since they encompass statutory
tax rates but also tax base allowances (such as depreciation and extra investment allowances,
valuation of inventories, deductions of financing costs, loss-carry-forwards and -backwards,
etc.).
2Most of the existing studies refer to the OECD (1991) when using pre-defined weights
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To summarize, in contrast to profit tax rates from balance sheets, forward-
looking effective tax rates avoid problems of endogeneity through a firm’s tax
planning activities. Similar to balance sheet tax rates they are effective by rep-
resenting a non-linear combination of a number of elements of profit taxation
affecting a firm’s tax payments (tax rates, depreciation allowances, etc.). How-
ever, the obvious disadvantage of previously used forward-looking effective tax
rates is that what is a model company with regard to investment and financing
opportunities starkly differs across industries. Accordingly, available effective
tax rates at the country level may be inappropriate when estimating response
parameters at a more disaggregated (industry or firm) level. Since investment
structure and financing opportunities differ across industries and even firms, an
identical change in, say, the statutory corporate tax rates or the depreciation
allowance parameters will translate into different changes of effective tax rates
at the firm level. With micro-level data, one would wish to exploit the much
larger variation in data about economic outcome and tax rates as compared to
country-level studies but still entertain the advantage of forward-looking tax
rates to avoid endogeneity problems associated with tax planning activities of
firms. It is this paper’s goal to compute firm-specific forward-looking effective
(marginal and average) tax rates.
We exploit firm-level information for the computation of forward-looking
effective tax rates by assuming that the hypothetical investment is identical
to the existing investment and financing structure of a firm. Applying this
framework, we compute forward-looking effective (marginal and average) tax
rates for a sample of 652,337 firms as compiled in Bureau van Dijk’s ORBIS
data-base. The analysis turns out very insightful. For instance, we find that
the country-specific element in these rates is relatively large for effective aver-
age tax rates (which are relevant for discrete/lumpy investment decisions) but
relatively small for effective marginal tax rates (i.e., for investment decisions
at the intensive margin). For the latter, firm-specific effects and, to a lesser
extent, industry-specific effects are relatively important.
To illustrate the relevance of exploiting firm-level variation in effective tax
rates, we refer to an example where we study the role of corporate taxation
on net investment as measured by the log difference in (total or fixed) assets
contained in ORBIS. We identify a significantly negative impact of cost of
capital – which is algebraically related to the effectivemarginal tax rate – on net
investments when using firm-level cost of capital. Alternatively, basing cost of
capital on the country-level effective marginal tax rate, we obtain the counter-
intuitive result that net investments are positively affected by an increase in
to compute an average of effective tax rates over all possible combinations of investment and
financing opportunities.
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cost of capital. The latter indicates that inference on the impact of effective
taxes on firm outcome should be based on firm-level rather than country-level
effective tax rates to avoid erroneous conclusions.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section outlines
the methodological approach to computing firm-level effective tax rates. Section
3 describes the data at hand and delivers descriptive statistics about firm-level
and country-level effective tax rates. Section 4 illustrates the importance of
using firm-level effective tax rates in firm-level studies by delivering an example
about the impact of cost of capital on firms’ net investments. The last section
concludes with a summary of our key insights.
2 Conceptual framework to calculate firm-specific
forward-looking effective tax rates
In a first step, we briefly describe the assumptions and procedures underlying
the computation of country-specific forward-looking effective marginal and av-
erage tax rates (EMTR and EATR). There, we closely follow Devereux and
Griffith (1999, 2003; see also King and Fullerton, 1984; OECD, 1991; Commis-
sion of the European Community, 1992, 2001; and Yoo, 2003). In a second step,
we explore the role of firm-specific information about investment and financing
opportunities for the computation of EMTR and EATR.
2.1 Country-specific effective tax rates
Consider a hypothetical investment which raises a firm’s capital stock at time
t by one unit. Assume that the investment changes the capital stock only for
one time period. This requires an investment of dIt = 1 in period t, and a
disinvestment of dIt+1 = −(1 − δ)(1 + pi) in t + 1, where δ is the economic
rate of depreciation and pi is the inflation rate. The perturbation of the capital
stock increases output in period t + 1, Qt+1, by dQt+1 = (p + δ)(1 + pi), with
p representing the (pre-tax) real rate of return on capital. In the absence of
taxation, the net present value (NPV) of investment, R∗, is given by
R∗ = −1 + 1
1 + i
{(p+ δ)(1 + pi) + (1− δ)(1 + pi)} = p− r
1 + r
, (1)
where i = (1 + r)(1 + pi)− 1 is the nominal interest rate.
The investment can be financed through retained earnings, new equity, and
external debt. In case of new equity financing, it is assumed that the initially
distributed shares are repurchased in t+1, so that the total number of outstand-
ing shares remains constant. For both forms of equity, the investment costs in t
3
are equal to 1 (as indicated by entry -1 in the first expression of (1)).3 For debt
financing, we have zero investment cost at t, but the dividend is reduced by
(1+ i) units in period t+1. Changing entry -1 to 0 in the first expression of (1)
and subtracting (1+ i) in the parentheses, we are left with R∗ = (p−r)/(1+r).
Therefore, in the absence of taxation the NPV of investment is independent of
the source of finance.
Now, let us introduce a corporate tax. Under the assumption that invest-
ment costs are fully deductible over the lifetime of the investment good, net
investment costs at t are equal to dIt = (1 − A), where A is the NPV of tax
depreciation allowances per unit of investment, discounted by ρ.4 Further, the
increase in output at time t + 1 is reduced to Qt+1 = (p + δ)(1 + pi)(1 − τ),
where τ is the statutory corporate tax rate.
It useful to define the after-tax rate of return on investment relative to
the case where it is financed through retained earnings. Under this source of
finance, the shareholder has to give up (1 − A) units of dividends in period t.
The retained funds are fully distributed as dividends in t+1. Net income (i.e.,
repatriated profits minus net investment costs) is subject to personal income
taxation. The overall tax liability of the shareholder is determined by the
integration between corporate and personal income taxation, captured by γ =
(1−md)/(1− c)(1−mg), where md and mg are the personal income tax rates
on dividends and capital gains and c is the rate of tax credit.5 Then, the net
dividend amounts to γ(p+δ)(1+pi)(1−τ) and the after-tax NPV of investment
to the shareholder is
RRE = −γ(1−A) + γ
1 + ρ
[(1 + pi)(p+ δ)(1− τ) + (1 + pi)(1− δ)(1−A)]
=
γ
1 + ρ
{(1 + pi)(p+ δ)(1− τ)− (1−A) [(1 + ρ)− (1 + pi)(1− δ)]} .(2)
If investment is financed by issuing new shares, the cost of raising one unit
of new equity is (1 − τ δˆ), where δˆ denotes the tax depreciation in the initial
period t. Compared to retained earnings, the dividend paid to the shareholder
in t is γ(1− τ δˆ). In t+ 1, the shareholder receives (1− τ δˆ) as a repurchase of
3The underlying assumption is that the firm owner (shareholder) pays one unit of capital
to obtain (p+δ)(1+pi) units as dividends in period t+1. In case of financing through retained
earnings, the shareholder has to give up one unit of dividends in t.
4ρ = (1−mi)i/(1−mg) is the shareholder’s nominal discount rate, which is exposed to the
personal income tax rate on interest, mi, and on capital gains, mg (see King and Fullerton,
1984, p. 23). A depends on the allowance scheme (straight line and declining balance as well
as combinations thereof) and on the rate of tax depreciation (the number of years for which
depreciation allowances can be claimed) as laid out in the tax codes. It is calculated according
to the formulas given in Devereux and Griffith (1999) and Yoo (2003).
5For instance, under a (pure) classical corporate tax system company profits are taxed
twice – once at the level of the firm and once when distributed as dividends, i.e., c = 0 (see
King, 1974). Assuming a comprehensive income tax (md = mg), we obtain γ = 1.
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equity. In comparison to retained earnings, this reduces dividend payments by
the same amount so that the shareholder’s net income is reduced by γ(1− τ δˆ).
Hence, the after-tax NPV of investment to the shareholder under new equity
financing is RNE = RRE + FNE , where
FNE = −(1− γ)(1− τ δˆ) + (1− γ)(1− τ δˆ)
1 + ρ
= −ρ(1− γ)(1− τ δˆ)
1 + ρ
. (3)
In case of debt financing, the firm borrows (1 − τ δˆ) in t, the shareholder
earns a gross dividend of exactly this amount (which does not have to be given
up, as in the case of retained earnings). In period t+1, debt plus interest has to
be repaid, (1− τ δˆ)(1 + i). If interest payments are fully deductible (as in most
tax systems), investment costs are reduced by (1 − τ δˆ)iτ . Hence, compared
to the case of retained earnings, the shareholder’s net income is reduced by
γ(1 − τ δˆ)[1 + i(1 − τ)]. Then, the shareholder’s after-tax NPV of investment
under debt financing is RD = RRE + FD, where
FD = γ(1− τ δˆ)− γ(1− τ δˆ)[1 + i(1− τ)]
1 + ρ
=
γ(1− τ δˆ)[ρ− i(1− τ)]
1 + ρ
. (4)
To summarize, the after-tax NPV of investment, R, is given by
R = RRE + F, (5)
where
F =

0 : Retained earnings
FNE : New equity
FD : Debt
denotes the additional costs of finance.
Different types of assets are treated differently by tax law. For instance, de-
preciation rates for machinery are usually higher than for buildings. Some coun-
tries also apply different depreciation schemes for different investment goods.
Therefore, A depends on the type of assets. For purposes of inventory valua-
tion, there are generally three methods applicable: the LIFO (last-in, first-out),
the FIFO (first-in, first out) and the average cost method.6
6Under the LIFO, assets purchased most recently at the higher prices are matched against
taxable revenues. Hence, only the LIFO avoids taxation of variations in stock values due to
inflation, and RRE is equal to (2). In case of the FIFO, any increase in value due to inflation
is subject to taxation. Therefore, RRE is adjusted to
RREinv = R
RE − γ
(1 + ρ)
τpi
(1− τ)(1 + pi) .
If the tax code only allows the average cost method, we multiply the second term of RREinv by
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The framework described above can be used to compute the tax burden on
a marginal investment, whose after-tax rate of return is just equal to the after-
tax rate of return on an alternative asset (i.e., a project with a zero after-tax
rate of return). The corresponding before-tax rate of return is known as the
cost of capital (see Auerbach, 1979). Using (2) and (5), and setting R = 0, the
cost of capital, p˜, is
p˜ =
1−A
(1− τ)(1 + pi) [ρ+ δ(1 + pi)− pi]−
F (1 + ρ)
γ(1− τ)(1 + pi)− δ . (6)
The effective marginal tax rate (EMTR) is defined as the difference between
the cost of capital and the after-tax rate of return of an alternative asset over
the cost of capital
EMTR =
(p˜− r¯)
p˜
, (7)
where r¯ is the after-tax rate of return of an alternative asset, defined as r¯ =
[(1−mi)i−pi]/(1+pi). Note that r¯ = r in the absence of shareholder taxation.
In contrast to the EMTR, the effective average tax rate (EATR) informs
about the tax burden on an average (infra-marginal) investment, which yields a
higher rate of return than the marginal investment (see Devereux and Griffith,
1999). The EATR is defined as the difference between the pre-tax NPV of
investment and the after-tax NPV of investment over the NPV of the pre-tax
rate of return on capital, p/(1 + r)
EATR =
R∗ −R
p/(1 + r)
, (8)
where R∗ is defined in (1) and R is given in (5).
2.2 Parametrization
Following the OECD (1991), Devereux and Griffith (1999, 2003), and Yoo
(2003), we parameterize the above described equations in the following way:
p = 0.2, r = 0.05, pi = 0.025; The rate of economic depreciation is set at
δm = 0.1225 for machinery, δb = 0.0361 for buildings, δinv = 0 for inventories,
and δI = 0.15 for intangible assets. δ, p, r and pi are identical for all coun-
tries. Information about statutory corporate tax rates and tax base deductions
(depreciation schemes and the corresponding rates for machinery, buildings and
intangibles, δˆm, δˆb, and δˆI ; extra-investment allowances; valuation of inventory)
are taken from various sources which are described in more detail in the ap-
pendix. For federal countries we also take into account local profit taxes and,
0.5.
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if applicable, their deduction from the tax base for federal profit taxes. As a
rule of thumb we use the unweighted average of local taxes for large countries
(e.g. United States or Germany) and a typical rate for the economic center for
small countries (e.g. Luxembourg).
If alternative depreciation schemes are allowed, we apply the most generous
one to calculate the NPV of depreciation allowances.7 Similarly, if tax law allows
for an optional choice over the inventory valuation methods, we apply the most
favorable one (i.e., LIFO is chosen against the average cost method, which, in
turn, is preferred over FIFO). Finally, we abstract from shareholder taxation,
implying mi = md = mg = 0 and γ = 1.8 Under γ = 1, the last expression
in (3) becomes zero, indicating that the after-tax NPV of investment to the
shareholder between retained earnings and new equity financing is identical.
Applying this parametrization and the above described equations, we are
able to compute country-specific effective tax rates for a set of four invest-
ment goods (buildings, machinery, inventory and intangible assets) and three
financing opportunities (retained earnings, new equity and debt). Instead of
calculating effective tax rates for each of these twelve combinations and weight-
ing them to a country-specific average effective tax rate afterwards, we com-
pute financed-weighted effective tax rates for each asset using the following
weights: 55% retained earnings, 10% new equity and 35% debt (see OECD,
1991). Next, we follow the Commission of the European Communities (2001)
and use equal weights for each asset to calculate country-specific averages of
EMTR and EATR.
2.3 Firm-specific effective tax rates
In the following, we describe how the framework to calculate country-specific
EMTR and EATR can be adopted to compute firm-specific effective tax rates.
For this purpose, we employ firm-level information from the Bureau van Dijk’s
ORBIS data-base, covering the necessary balance sheet information for more
than 650,000 firms.9
7In some cases, it is possible to change from the declining balance to the straight line,
where the point in time for this switch is typically defined in tax law. Otherwise, we assume
that the switch is chosen as soon as the value of the straight line depreciation exceeds the one
of the declining balance (see also Devereux and Griffith, 1999).
8Our firm-level data-set used below also includes large publicly owned companies, where the
identity of the shareholders, and, therefore, the applicable tax regime (e.g., personal income
tax rate on capital income, residence country, etc.) is unknown. Further, a substantial part of
firms is owned by other firms, so that shareholder taxation is probably not too relevant here.
To avoid possibly biased estimation results coming from these sources, we decided to exclude
shareholder taxation. This also in line with previous literature (see Devereux and Griffith,
1998, 1999, 2003; Devereux, Griffith, and Klemm, 2002)
9See Table A.1 and Table A.2 in the Appendix for a list of variables and the according
definition in ORBIS (balance sheets as well as profits and loss accounts).
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To calculate country-specific effective tax rates we use pre-defined weights
over financing opportunities and assets. For the computation of firm-specific
effective tax rates, we first decompose a firm’s total assets into tangible and
intangible ones. We define ΘTf , Θ
I
f , and Θ
S
f as the firm specific share of tangible
fixed assets, TFAf , intangible fixed assets, IFAf , and stocks of current assets
(i.e., inventories), STOf , in total assets
ΘTf =
TFAf
IFAf + TFAf + STOf
ΘIf =
IFAf
IFAf + TFAf + STOf
ΘSf =
STOf
IFAf + TFAf + STOf
, (9)
where f indicates the fth firm. Note that the sum of all fixed asset shares is
equal to one: ΘTf + Θ
I
f + Θ
S
f = 1. ORBIS does not report separate balance-
sheet figures for buildings and machinery. While this lack of information does
not allow splitting ΘTf into further components, we can use industry-specific
weights, as reported in McKenzie, Mansour, and Brule (1998), to account for
the heterogeneous composition of capital stocks across sectors.10 Denoting the
kth industry weight by θbk for buildings, by θ
m
k for machinery, and by θ
l
k for
land, we can decompose the firm-specific share of tangible fixed assets ΘTf into
Θbf = Θ
T
f θ
b
k
Θmf = Θ
T
f θ
m
k
Θlf = Θ
T
f θ
l
k. (10)
Since θbk + θ
m
k + θ
l
k = 1 it follows that Θ
b
f +Θ
m
f +Θ
l
f = Θ
T
f (see Table A.5
in the Appendix). According to Table A.5, the industry weights for θ are not
identical for large and small companies. Therefore, we use firm type-specific
values of θbk, θ
m
k and θ
l
k in (10), defining a company as large if it has more than
100 mn. U.S. dollars of total assets.
The weights in (10) are used to calculate the firm-specific economic depreci-
ation rates, δf , tax depreciation allowances that can be claimed on the first year
of the investment at the firm level, δˆf , and the firm-specific NPV of depreciation
10Tables A.3 and A.4 provide information on how the industry codes from McKenzie, Man-
sour, and Brule (1998) are matched with the ones in the ORBIS data-base. Table A.5 reports
the industry-specific weights that are used in (9).
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allowances, Af
δf = δbΘbf + δ
mΘmf + δ
lΘlf + δ
IΘIf + δ
invΘSf
δˆf = δˆbΘbf + δˆ
mΘmf + δˆ
lΘlf + δˆ
IΘIf + δˆ
invΘSf
Af = AbΘbf +A
mΘmf +A
lΘlf +A
IΘIf +A
invΘSf . (11)
δ indicates the rate of economic depreciation as defined above (i.e., δm =
0.1225, δb = 0.0361, and δI = 0.15), and A is the NPV of depreciation al-
lowances, depending on tax depreciation rates and the allowance scheme. δˆ is
the depreciation rate for tax purposes, taken from national tax codes. Note that
land and inventories are not tax depreciable, i.e., δˆl = 0, δˆinv = 0. Similarly,
δinv = 0, δl = 0, and, hence, Ainv = 0, Al = 0. As for country-specific effective
tax rates, we account for the valuation of inventories for tax purposes.
The second point where firm-level variation comes in is the financing struc-
ture of firms. As discussed above, we do not account for shareholder taxation,
i.e., γ = 1 and FNE = 0 in (4), implying that the NPV of new equity financing
is equal to the one of retained earnings. Therefore, we only distinguish be-
tween equity (the sum of retained earnings and new equity) and debt financing
when weighting all combinations between financing opportunities and assets to
a single (overall) EMTR or EATR for each firm.11 Specifically, the weighting
parameter for debt is equal to the debt ratio, bf , as defined by the sum of
current liabilities, CLf , and non-current liabilities, NLf , to total assets, TAf
bf =
CLf +NLi
TAf
. (12)
Accordingly, the weighting parameter for both sources of equity is 1 − bf . To
exclude outliers, we drop all observations with 0 > bf > 1.12
11By considering the observed financing structure at the firm level, we assume that the
forward looking effective tax rates are not subject to additional planning going forward and
that we may hold the firm to the effects of its past planning. Based on this assumption, we
may treat the firm-specific forward-looking effective tax rates as exogenous in the subsequent
empirical analysis.
12While it is possible that bf > 1 in the short-run (e.g., under current losses and/or negative
loss carry-forwards), this assumption is less reasonable for the purpose of financing an invest-
ment project. In addition, we drop all observations with missing values or entries less than
zero for total assets, fixed assets, stocks of current assets, tangibles and intangibles, turnover,
current and non-current liabilities.
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3 Firm-level versus country-level effective tax rates
3.1 Data
We use a panel data-set of all firms with total assets larger than 2 mn. U.S.
dollars contained in Bureau van Dijk’s ORBIS data-base within the period 2000-
2005. After eliminating all observations for which the necessary data on assets
and finance are not available (see the previous section), we are left with an
unbalanced data-set of 652,337 firms in 38 countries and 6 years which contains
2,522,668 observations.
Table 1 provides insights in the allocation of data-points across the 38 coun-
tries in the sample. Obviously, the firm coverage is quite high for Belgium,
Denmark, France, Italy, Norway, Spain, and United Kingdom. Of all obser-
vations in the sample, 2,399,703 are based upon unconsolidated balance sheets
and 122,965 refer to consolidated ones. Since the data-set is unbalanced, it may
be useful to provide some information about the spacing of the data points in
time. Table 2 summarizes the latter and suggests that for only about one-fifth
of the firms the necessary information to compute forward-looking effective tax
rates at the firm-level is available in each of the six years. However, for more
than one-half of the firms we are able to compute such tax rates in at least four
of the six years covered.
> Tables 1 and 2 <
In principle, forward-looking effective tax rates are a function of intangible
assets but data on the latter are not available for all firms in the sample. There-
fore, we also compute effective tax rates on the basis of tangible assets only.
It turns out that the results are very similar for the two concepts (including
versus excluding intangibles) so that we use effective tax rates which ignore
intangibles in part of the empirical exercise for the sake of maximum sample
coverage.
3.2 Descriptive statistics
In a first step, let us provide moments of the distributions of firm-level and
country-level effective tax rates. Table 3 summarizes firm-level backward-
looking effective tax rates (AETR)13 and firm- as well as country-level EMTR
13In line with previous research (see Mutti and Grubert, 2004, and Desai, Foley and Hines
2004), we refer to balance sheet information defining backward looking effective tax rates.
More precisely, they reflect profit tax payments as a fraction of pre-tax profits.
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and EATR for various percentiles of the respective distributions along with the
means, standard deviations, minimum and maximum values.
> Table 3 <
The variation of firm-level EATR comes mainly from the tails of the distri-
bution but it is small between the 20th and the 80th percentile. AETR varies
less in the tails but comparatively more in the inter-quartile range than its
forward-looking counterpart. The variance in forward-looking EMTR is com-
paratively higher both in the tails and the center of the distribution. Note that
the EMTR might be negative if the investment is financed to large degree with
tax- deductible debt or when a country offers favorable depreciation allowances
and extra investment credits. In our sample, the forward-looking EMTR is
negative for 880,211 observations.
One key insight from Table 3 is that firm-level effective tax rates vary a lot
more than country-level effective tax rates. Two major sources of this variance
in the data are industry-specific differences in the composition of assets (for
instance, buildings versus machinery) and differences in financing at the firm
level.
How much of this variance is actually due to the country versus the firm
level? This question can be answered by means of an analysis of variance
(ANOVA). There, we use a design matrix of indicator variables (country and
other dummy variables) to exactly decompose the total variance in AETR,
EMTR, and EATR into its components. We suggest a model which reads
yckstf = α+ µc + λk + ζs + ξt + ηckstf , (13)
where yckstf is the corresponding effective tax rate in country c = 1, ..., 38,
NACE 4-digit industry k = 1, ..., 717, size class14 s = 1, ..., 10, and year t =
2000, ..., 2005. The index f = 1, ..., 652, 337 in y and η refers to firms. α is the
constant of the model; µc is the parameter for the effect specific to country c
(e.g., capturing the importance of country-specific effective tax rates); λk is the
parameter for the value of yckstf specific to industry k; ζs is the parameter for the
value of yckstf specific to size class s; ξt is the parameter for the value of yckstf
specific to year t; and ηckstf is a remainder component which is not attributable
to either countries, industries or size classes. Anything that is not contributed
by countries (and the constant) should be captured by λk + ζs + ξt + ηckstf .
We may refer to the total variance in yckstf as SSy and to the partial sums
14Measured by ten indicator variables for deciles of the distribution of total assets.
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of squares of the country, industry, size-class, and time effects as SSc, SSk,
SSs, and SSt, respectively. The residual sum of squares of that model is SSη.
In an ANOVA as in equation (13), SSy = SSc + SSk + SSs + SSt + SSη, and
SSc+SSk+SSs+SSt is referred to as the ’model’ sum of squares. Consequently,
SSη is the ’residual’ sum of squares.
If country-level effective tax rates were the major drivers of firm-level effec-
tive tax rates, we should observe SSc to contribute in a major way to SSy. If id-
iosyncratic effects at the firm level dominate, SSc or even SSc+SSk+SSs+SSt
would contribute to a minor extent to SSy. Note that (SSc+SSk+SSs)/SSy =
1−SSη/SSy is nothing else than the model R2. Table 4 sheds light on the em-
pirical estimates of the ANOVA as outlined in equation (13) for the AETR and
Table 5 summarizes comparable findings for the EMTR and EATR.
> Tables 4 and 5 <
The findings in the tables support two conclusions. First, the firm-level
component in effective tax rates is quite sizable, according to the R2: country-
specific, industry-specific, size-class-specific, and time-specific effects together
explain only about 18 percent of the variation in AETR, about 57 percent of
the variation in EATR and about 24 percent of the variation in EMTR. The
remaining part of the variation is firm specific. Moreover, it is interesting to see
that country-level variation in effective tax rates is fairly small. Of the model
sum of squares, the country-specific component explains about 68 percent of
AETR (Table 4), about 83 percent of EATR (Table 5), and about 56-60 percent
of EMTR (in Table 5). But recall that the model R2 as such was fairly small,
especially, for EMTR.
While the ANOVA models in Tables 4 and 5 indicate that the nexus between
country-specific effects and firm-level effective tax rates is small in general, it
is not informative about the correlation between country-level and firm-level
effective tax rates as such. Table 6 sheds light on the latter and reports pairwise
correlation coefficients for EATR and EMTR at the country and the firm level
along with the corresponding p-values.
> Table 6 <
The results in the table suggest that the country-specific effective tax rates
are significantly and positively correlated with firm-specific ones: the correla-
tion coefficients between country-level EATR and firm-level EATR as well as
AETR are significant, and also the one between EMTR at the country versus
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firm level is significant, irrespective of whether we include intangibles in the
computation of forward-looking tax rates or not (see the light-gray-shaded cells
in Table 6). Yet, the correlation coefficient for forward-looking country-specific
and firm-specific EMTRs is fairly small (notice also that the correlation coeffi-
cient between AETR and firm-level EATR is small). The correlation coefficients
between country- and firm-specific EATR are higher than that of country- and
firm-specific EMTR (compare the coefficient in row [3] and column [2] with the
one in row [5] and column [4] of Table 6).
4 Tentative empirical analysis: net investments and
cost of capital
The main goal of this paper is to deliver an approach for computing effective tax
rates at the firm level and to calculate such rates in a large cross-sectional data-
set along with providing a comparison with their country-level counterparts.
In this section, we indicate their potential role in firm-level studies on the
consequences of corporate taxation for economic activity.
Let us consider the effect of cost of capital (p˜ in Section 2) on net investment,
which represents a classical question in econometrics (for instance, see the early
contributions by Hall and Jorgenson, 1967; Eisner and Nadiri, 1968; Jorgenson
and Siebert, 1968) as well as public finance (see, e.g., Cummins, Hassett, and
Hubbard, 1994; Hassett and Hubbard, 2002, provide an overview). p˜ is defined
in equation (6) and its relationship to EMTR is given by equation (7).
Our short and highly unbalanced panel data hardly allows to estimate dy-
namic investment models (see, e.g., Blundell, Bond, and Meghir, 1996). How-
ever, it is possible to infer the impact of p˜ on net investment based on the
within variation of our data set. More specifically, we estimate the following
econometric model relying on the early investment literature
ln I˜tf = β0 + β1∆S˜tf + β2∆p˜t + ξt + νtf , (14)
where ln I˜tf denotes the annual difference in log (total or fixed) assets of firm
f in year t, ∆ ln S˜tf annual difference in log sales of firm f in year t, ∆ ln p˜t
is the annual difference in log p˜t (cost of capital) of either firm f in country c
and year t or the average firm in country c in year t,15 ξt is a fixed time effect,
and νtf is the disturbance term of firm f in year t. The unknown regression
coefficients are denoted by β0, β1, and β2. In general, we report standard errors
of these parameters which are robust to heteroskedasticity and up to fifth-order
15The former is based upon the firm-specific EMTR in equation (6) while the latter is based
upon the country-specific EMTR in equation (6).
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autocorrelation in νtf . Clearly, we expect β1 > 0 and β2 < 0. Let us summarize
our findings for the data at hand in Table 7.
> Table 7 <
A key insight from Table 7 is that consideration of firm-specific variation in
forward-looking effective tax rates may be crucial. In our application, the use
of country-specific cost of capital instead of firm-specific cost of capital is very
misleading: while country-specific cost of capital display a positive impact on
net investments – which seems counterintuitive – firm-specific ones reduce net
investments significantly as expected. This result is independent of whether we
use total or fixed assets to determine net investments.
The reason for this finding lies in the relatively strong difference in the mo-
ments of the distribution of firm-specific versus country-specific effective tax
rates (see Table 3): average firm-specific EATR is somewhat smaller than av-
erage country-specific EATR in our data, and average firm-specific EMTR is
much smaller than average country-specific EMTR; moreover, the firm-specific
EATR and EMTR have a larger variance than their country-specific counter-
parts. We have seen that firm-specific effective tax rates are correlated with
country-specific ones (see Table 6). Accounting for country-specific cost of cap-
ital or effective tax rates in a firm-level study induces measurement error and
likely leads to an endogeneity bias. The reason is that the disturbance term
picks up firm-level variation in true firm-level cost of capital which is correlated
with the average country-level cost of capital.
We have addressed the robustness of the results in Table 7 in two regards:
the chosen parameterization to compute forward-looking effective tax rates and
the possible influence of loss carry forwards.16
First, forward looking effective tax rates are known to be sensitive to the
choice of expected rates of inflation and return. The benchmark results reported
in the tables are based on a rate of inflation of 2.5 percent and a rate of return
of 5 percent. In the sensitivity analysis we chose alternative parameter values
of 5 percent for the rate of inflation and 3 percent for the the rate of return,
respectively. However, while this affects the matrix of correlation coefficients
as reported in Table 6 quite significantly, our conclusions from Table 7 do not
change in qualitative terms: the impact of the country-level cost of capital on
investment is positive (which is at odds with our expectations) and the one of
firm-level cost of capital is negative as expected. The estimated parameters of
sales and cost of capital are in a similar range as the ones in Table 7.
16We will be happy to make tables available upon request but suppress them here and only
briefly summarize our findings below.
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Second, loss carry forward would eliminate a possible impact of profit tax-
ation due to the deductibility of losses in the past. To avoid this problem to
the largest possible extent, we ran the models as in Table 7 on a sub-sample of
firms which did not report negative profits in any single year between 2000 and
2005. While this reduces the number of observations from 1,283,906 in Table 7
to 788,029, the originally drawn conclusions remain valid in qualitative terms.
Again, the results suggest that relying on firm-level rather than country-level
effective tax rates leads to the negative relationship between cost of capital and
net investment while this is not the case for cost of capital based on the country
level.
Taking stock, we may draw the following conclusions. Recent empirical
work in public finance increasingly relies on firm-level data. With such data
one may entertain the advantage of controlling for unobservable effects so that,
e.g., unbiased profit tax elasticities may be inferred which is much harder at the
aggregate (country) level. However, related empirical work increasingly employs
country-level effective tax rates to infer the tax elasticities of firm-level outcome
(see Buettner and Ruf, 2007, or Moore and Ruane, 2005, for recent examples).
Our study illustrates that this may be harmful, and there are two reasons for
that. First, firms are heterogeneous with regard to the structure of their capital
stocks and the associated depreciation rates, and they differ with regard to debt
and other financial variables influencing firm-level effective tax rates. Ignoring
this heterogeneity may be harmful when drawing inference of the importance of
tax policy at the micro level. Second, ignoring firm heterogeneity may be even
harmful for aggregate (country-level) inference. Since effective tax rates are
nonlinear functions of tax and non-tax parameters, (weighted or un-weighted)
country-level effective tax rates - and, hence, the responsiveness of aggregate
outcome to country-level effective tax rates - which are computed from firm-
level effective tax rates may differ starkly from ones that are computed from
averages of characteristics of all firms in a country. The latter may lead to both
a misrepresentation of the country-specific effective tax rates as such as well as
biased inference about the responsiveness of economic outcome to taxation.
5 Conclusions
Studies on the behavioral response to taxation at the firm level typically use
backward-looking tax burden measures or country-specific forward-looking ef-
fective tax rates as developed by King and Fullerton (1984) and Devereux and
Griffith (1999, 2003), among others. The former are based on a firm’s tax
payments relative to profits according to balance sheet information. Tax pay-
ments, however, may be influenced by tax planning activities. Therefore, profit
15
tax rates from balance sheets are not exogenous from an empirical perspective.
This is not the case for forward-looking effective tax rates, which inform about
the tax burden on a hypothetical investment project with a pre-defined mix of
investment and financing opportunities. However, the nature of a hypothetical
investment is typically assumed symmetric across industries and firms and dis-
misses any industry- and firm-specific component in the underlying assumptions
about investment and financing opportunities. From this perspective, there is
obvious demand in empirical research for a tax burden measure that main-
tains the advantage of forward-looking effective tax rates (i.e., the exogeneity
vis-a`-vis tax planning activities) while entertaining variation across firms and
industries.
This paper applies and extends the Devereux and Griffith (1999, 2003) ap-
proach to calculate forward-looking effective marginal and average tax rates
(EMTR and EATR) at the firm- rather than the country-level. We compute
these rates using a sample of more than 650,000 firms within and outside Europe
as compiled in Bureau van Dijk’s ORBIS database. Comparing the variation of
firm-specific EMTR and EATR with their country-specific counterparts we find
that the country-level component in a firm’s effective tax burden is generally
much less important than the firm-specific one. However, country-level effective
tax rates are significantly related to those at the firm level, especially for the
EATR.
We demonstrate the potential importance of these findings in an empirical
example about the influence of cost of capital (which is algebraically related to
EMTR) on firm-level changes in net investments. In particular, we use firm-
specific cost of capital in our regressions and contrast the results to the ones that
are obtained when using country-specific cost of capital. We identify a clear
negative impact of firm-specific cost of capital but a positive one of country-
specific cost of capital on net investments. Clearly, the latter is counterintuitive
and has to do with the mis-measurement of effective tax rates for individual
firms when using country-specific EMTR to compute cost of capital. This
evidence suggests that it seems problematic to employ country-level effective
tax rates in firm-level studies, because this could lead to potentially misleading
conclusions.
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Table 1: Composition of the firm-level data by country
Number of Number of
Country observations Country observations
Austria 6,767 Latvia 4,237
Belgium 120,527 Lithuania 3,587
Bulgaria 7,070 Luxembourg 1,635
Canada 6,428 Malta 177
Croatia 18,101 Netherlands 56,368
Cyprus 8 Norway 92,683
Czech Republic 31,541 Poland 36,051
Denmark 92,246 Portugal 26,362
Estonia 7,961 Russia 66,183
Finland 41,156 Slovak Republic 6,743
France 420,381 Slovenia 7,808
Germany 57,779 Spain 360,342
Greece 55,501 Sweden 76,567
Hungary 17,796 Switzerland 3,579
Iceland 749 Turkey 216
Ireland 14,854 Ukraine 32,165
Italy 504,145 United Kingdom 235,410
Japan 43,623 United States 29,547
Korea 25,044 Yugoslavia 11,241
Notes: The total number of firms is 652,337. The total number of
observations is 2,522,668. There are 38 countries and 6 years (2000-2005).
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Table 2: Allocation of the firms across time
Years covered
No. of firms Percent 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
137,472 21.07 • • • • • •
113,927 17.46 • • • • •
48,152 7.38 •
40,998 6.28 • •
28,961 4.44 • • • • •
28,294 4.34 • • •
25,716 3.94 • • • •
23,164 3.55 • • • •
21,096 3.23 • •
184,557 28.29 other patterns
Notes: The total number of firms is 652,337 (100 percent).• indicates an entry in this year.
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Table A.1: Data available from Orbis: Balance sheet
Item Description Definition Variable
1 Fixed Assets 1a + 1b + 1c FAi
1a Intangible Fixed Assets IFAi
1b Tangible Fixed Assets TFAi
1c Other Fixed Assets OFAi
2 Current Assets 2a + 2b + 2c + 2d CAi
2a Stocks STOi
2b Debtors DBTi
2c Other Current Assets OCAi
2d Cash and Cash Equivalent CSHi
3 Total Assets 1 + 2 TAi
4 Shareholders Funds 4a + 4b SFi
4a Capital CAPi
4b Other Shareholders Funds OSFi
5 Non Current Liabilities 5a + 5b NLi
5a Long Term Debt LTDi
5b Other Non Current Liabilities ONLi
6 Current Liabilities 6a + 6b + 6c CLi
6a Loans LNSi
6b Creditors CRDi
6c Other Current Liabilities OCLi
7 Total Shareholders
Funds and Liabilities 1 + 2 TLi
8 Memo Lines
8a Working Capital 2a + 2b - 6b WKCi
8b Net Current Assets 2 - 6 NCAi
8c Enterprise Value EV Ai
8d Employees EMPi
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Table A.2: Data available from Orbis: Profit and loss account
Item Description Definition Variable
1 Operating revenue OREVi
1a Sales SALEi
2 Cost of Goods Sold CGDSi
3 Gross Profit 1 - 2 GRPRi
4 Other Operating Expenses OOPEi
5 Operating Profit/Loss[=EBIT] 3 - 4 EBITi
5a Financial Revenues FREVi
5b Financial Expenses FEXPi
6 Financial Profit/Loss 5a - 5b FPLi
7 Profit/Loss before Tax
and Extraordinary Items 5 - 6 PLBTi
7a Taxation TAXi
8 Profit/Loss after Tax 7 - 7a PLATi
8a Extraordinary Revenues EREVi
8b Extraordinary Expenses EEXPi
9 Extraordinary Profit/Loss 8a - 8b EXPLi
10 Profit/Loss for Period
[=Net Income] 8 - 9 PRLOi
11 Memo Lines
11a Export Turnover EXPi
11b Material costs MATCi
11c Cost of employees CEMPi
11d Depreciation DEPRi
11e Interest paid INTi
11f Cash flow 10 + 11d CFi
11g Added value 7a + 10 +
11c + 11d + 11e ADDVi
11h EBITDA 5 + 11d EBITDAi
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Table A.3: Industry classifications: McKenzie et. al.
Industry Name SIC Code Division Name
(1980)
Agriculture 0100-0299 Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing
Fishing and Trapping 0300-0399 Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing
Subtotal 0100-0399 Average Agriculture,
Forestry and Fishing
Forestry 0400-0599 Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing
Mining 0600-0629 Mining
Oil and Gas 0630-0799 Oil and Gas
Mining 0800-0899 Mining
Oil and Gas 0910-0919 Oil and Gas
Mining 0920-0999 Mining
Food 1000-1099 Manufacturing
Beverages 1100-1199 Manufacturing
Tobacco 1200-1299 Manufacturing
Rubber 1500-1599 Manufacturing
Plastic 1600-1699 Manufacturing
Leather 1700-1799 Manufacturing
Textile 1800-1999 Manufacturing
Clothing 2400-2499 Manufacturing
Wood 2500-2599 Manufacturing
Furniture 2600-2699 Manufacturing
Paper 2700-2799 Manufacturing
Print and Publishing 2800-2899 Manufacturing
Primary Metal 2900-2999 Manufacturing
Metal Fabrication 3000-3099 Manufacturing
Machinery 3100-3199 Manufacturing
Transportation Equipment 3200-3299 Manufacturing
Electrical 3300-3399 Manufacturing
Mineral 3500-3599 Manufacturing
Petroleum 3600-3699 Manufacturing
Chemical 3700-3799 Manufacturing
Miscellaneous Manufacturing 3900-3999 Manufacturing
Subtotal 1000-3999 Average Manufacturing
Construction 4000-4499 Construction
Transportation 4500-4699 Transportation and Storage
Storage 4700-4799 Transportation and Storage
Subtotal 4500-4799 Average Transportation and Storage
Communications 4800-4899 Communication
Electrical Power, Gas and Water 4900-4999 Public Utilities
Wholesale Trade 5000-5999 Wholesale Trade
Retail Trade 6000-6999 Retail Trade
Services to Business Management 7700-7799 Other Services
Government, Personal
and Misc. Services 9100-9999 Other Services
Subtotal 7700-7799 Average Other Services
Total 0100-9999
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A Data Sources
The data-set of tax parameters used in this paper is an extension of the tax
data used by Loretz (2008).
• Loretz S., 2008. Corporate Taxation in the OECD in a Wider Context
Oxford Review of Economic Policy 24, 639-660.
Information for non-OECD countries is primarily from the following online
databases of the International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation (IBFD):
• Central/Eastern Europe - Taxation & Investment
• Corporate Taxation in Europe
• European Tax Services
• European Tax Surveys
• Global Tax Surveys
• Tax News Service
Additionally, we exploit information of tax law from the following printed
publications:
• Baker&McKenzie, 1999. Survey of the effective tax burden in the Euro-
pean Union, Amsterdam.
• Commission of the European Communities, 2001. Towards an internal
market without tax obstacles. A strategy for providing companies with a
consolidated corporate tax base for their EU-wide activities, COM (2001)
582 final, Brussels.
• Ernst&Young, 2003. Company taxation in the new EU Member states
survey of the tax regimes and effective tax burdens for multinational in-
vestors, Frankfurt am Main.
• Ernst&Young, 1998-2003. Worldwide Corporate Tax Guide, Frankfurt am
Main.
• IBFD, 1990-2005. European Tax Handbook, Amsterdam.
• IBFD, 1990-2001. Steuerberaterhandbuch Europa, Bonn: Stollfuss.
• Nexia International, 1992-2003. The international Handbook of Corporate
and Personal Taxation, London: LexisNexis.
• PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 1999. Spectre: Study of potential of effective
corporate tax rates in Europe, Report commissioned by the Ministry of
Finance in the Netherlands, Amsterdam.
• PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 1990-2004. Corporate taxes: worldwide sum-
maries, Hoboken: Wiley.
• Yoo, K.-Y., 2003. Corporate taxation of foreign direct investment income
1991-2001, OECD Economics Department Working Paper No. 365, Paris:
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.
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